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1 INTRODUCTION
Prices are more likely to rise than to fall. This asymmetric response to shocks
appears to hold in a number of markets, including gasoline ((Karrenbrock
(1991), Borenstein, Camerer and Gilbert (1997)), bank deposits (Neumark
and Sharpe (1992), Jackson (1997)), and agricultural products ((Karrenbrock
(1991)). More generalized evidence comes from Peltzman’s (2000) study
of over 240 markets. He finds that asymmetries are pervasive, substantial
and durable, in producer goods as well as consumer goods, and exist in
low inflation as well as high inflation periods. Buckle and Carlson (2000)
also find generalized evidence of such asymmetries from survey data. These
asymmetries also apply at the level of price indices — Verbrugge (2002)
confirms this for most disaggregated price indices in the US, and in a cross-
country study (Verbrugge, 1998), finds evidence of asymmetry for almost all
countries.
The macroeconomic significance of such an asymmetry in adjustment has
often been stressed. Tobin (1972) suggested that asymmetries were impor-
tant in price as well as wage setting, and argued that this lead to aggre-
gate demand shocks having asymmetric effects. That is, positive aggregate
demand shocks would raise prices while negative demand shocks cause out-
put contraction. Such asymmetric demand effects are documented by Cover
(1992), DeLong and Summers (1988) and Sichel (1993). Asymmetries have
gained attention in the current low inflation environment in OECD countries,
with some economists arguing that low inflation may be a mixed blessing.
By preventing relative price adjustments, low inflation exacerbates the ef-
fects of negative demand shocks, and reduces the equilibrium level of output
(see DeLong and Summers (1988) and Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996)).
A contrary view, (see Lucas (2000)), is that there remain significant wel-
fare gains from reducing inflation even further towards zero. Asymmetric
adjustment to cost shocks can also result in first order output losses from
international commodity price fluctuations, thus making the stabilization of
prices desirable (Kanbur and Vines, 1986).
To understand the empirical evidence and to evaluate these contrary
macroeconomic views, it is imperative that we understand the underlying
reasons for asymmetric nominal rigidities. If we understand the foundations
of such asymmetries, then only can one evaluate the impact of changes in
the environment, such as changes in trend inflation. However, there has been
little in terms of microfoundations for the assumption for asymmetric nom-
inal rigidities. If prices are set by optimizing agents, then one should, in
general, expect a symmetric response to shocks. Asymmetries can arise if
utility or profit functions are not quadratic (Kimball, 1989), but there seems
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little reason for systematic deviations in one direction or the other.
It is recognized that positive trend inflation may be a reason for asymmet-
ric adjustment (see Tsiddon (1993) and Ball and Mankiw (1994)). Positive
trend inflation, aggravates positive shocks while mitigating negative shocks,
so that asymmetric price adjustment to shocks arises naturally. However,
since inflation is the only cause for asymmetry, adjustment becomes sym-
metric as trend inflation falls to zero, and the asymmetry is reversed with
trend deflation. Thus one would not expect aggregate demand shocks to
have asymmetric effects when inflation is low, and the optimal inflation rate
in indeed zero. Ball and Mankiw conclude that since inflation is the only
cause of asymmetry in adjustment by rational agents, Tobin’s arguments do
not seem to be valid, at least when agents are behaving optimally. Neverthe-
less, trend inflation seems to be an inadequate explanation for asymmetric
adjustment. Peltzman shows that the asymmetry is as pronounced in the
period 1982-1996, when trend inflation was below 2%. DeLong and Sum-
mers (1988) also find that asymmetric output effects of demand shocks are
present (and indeed, stronger) during the Great Depression, when the price
trend was deflationary. Peltzman’s comment, that asymmetric adjustment
“poses a challenge to theory”, thus seems a valid one.
This paper proposes a simple argument for asymmetric adjustment even
in the absence of inflation. We argue that in the real world, the notion of
an industry — a group of firms producing closely substitutable products —
plays an important role. Introducing the notion of an industry into standard
imperfect competition models has two immediate implications:
1. The existence of competitor firms in the same industry reduces equilib-
rium prices, as compared to a situation where the industry consists of
only one firm. Firms in the industry would be better off if they could
collude on higher prices, but this impossible to sustain.
2. A firm finds it important to keep its price in line with its competitors
in the same industry — the prices charged by firms outside its industry
are less important.
Point (2) above implies that if the industry is subjected to a shock, and
if the firm must incur a menu cost to adjust price, its optimal choice de-
pends upon whether other firms in the industry are adjusting or not. This
gives rise to multiple equilibria in the adjustment decision at the industry
level — there is an equilibrium where all firms in the industry adjust, and
another equilibrium where no firm adjusts. We argue that firms are likely to
coordinate upon the equilibrium which they collectively prefer, which in the
2
context of point (1) above, is the equilibrium in which prices are higher. This
corresponds to raising prices in response to a positive shock, but not cutting
prices when the shock is negative. Thus asymmetric adjustment arises nat-
urally in this model as an industry response to shocks so as keep prices as
high as possible.
We show that asymmetric price adjustment implies asymmetric adjust-
ment of output to demand shocks, in line with the empirical evidence. We
also analyze the effects of such asymmetric adjustment in a dynamic context,
and show that long run equilibrium output is lower than the static level. The
effects of inflation on equilibrium output are also examined.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. We begin in
section 2 by setting out a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition and examine the static equilibrium in this model. Section 3
considers the effects of a one-time shock when firms face menu costs of price
adjustment. Section 3 considers a full dynamic model, and the effects of
asymmetric adjustment on equilibrium output, and section 4 considers the
effects of inflation in this economy. The final section reviews some of the
related literature and concludes.
2 THE MODEL
The model we develop is a simple generalization of the standard model of
an imperfectly competitive macro-economy, as set out for example in Blan-
chard and Fisher (1988). We allow each industry to consist of many pro-
ducers, rather than just one. 1There is a continuum of industries distributed
uniformly on the unit interval. In each industry, there is a continuum of
producer-consumers also distributed uniformly on the unit interval. Index
industries by upper case letters, and producers within an industry by lower
case letters, so that producer r in industry S has index rS, where r ∈ [0, 1]
and S ∈ [0, 1]. The utility of the typical producer-consumer depends upon
an index of her total consumption, CrS, and is decreasing in the output she
produces, YrS, in the following manner
UrS = CrS −
(
γ − 1
γβ
)
ΛJ (YrS)
β (1)
β is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor plus one, and is as-
sumed to be greater than one. ΛJ is an industry level productivity parameter
1This more general model nests the standard model as a special case, and may be useful
in analyzing other macroeconomic issues as well — Bhaskar (2002) uses this to provide an
explanation for staggered price setting.
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and γ−1
γβ
is an inessential constant. The index of consumption, CrS, is com-
posed as follows. First, the consumption of products of individual producers
in any particular industry, say industry J, are aggregated CES fashion, giv-
ing rise to CJrS, the index of the total consumption of goods from industry J ,
by producer rS. These industry aggregates are then aggregated to give the
index of total consumption.
CJrS =


∫
i∈[0,1]
(
C iJrS
)(γ−1)/γ
di


γ/(γ−1)
(2)
CrS =


∫
J∈[0,1]
(
CJrS
)(θ−1)/θ
dJ


θ/(θ−1)
(3)
Note that C iJrS is the consumption of the good produced by producer i in
industry J by consumer rS. The key parameters of our model are γ and θ.
γ is the elasticity of substitution between products which are produced by
the same industry, while θ is the elasticity of substitution between products
produced by different industries. Our key assumption is that γ > θ, so that
the notion of an industry makes sense. Note that if γ = θ, our model is
identical to the standard models of Blanchard and Fischer (1988) so that the
standard model is a special case of ours. We assume that γ > 1, to ensure
the existence of a solution to the producer’s maximization problem.
The utility function implies that the industry price index, P J , and output
index, Y J ,are given by
P J =


∫
i∈[0,1]
(
P iJ
)(1−γ)
di


1/(1−γ)
(4)
Y J =
1
P J
∫
i∈[0,1]
(
P iJY iJ
)
di (5)
The aggregate price level, P, and aggregate output index, Y, are given by
P =


∫
J∈[0,1]
(
P J
)(1−θ)
dJ


1/(1−θ)
(6)
Y =
1
P
∫
J∈[0,1]
(
P JY J
)
dJ (7)
4
To allow nominal shocks to play a role, we assume that the relation between
money balances and spending on goods is given by
Y =
M
P
(8)
The above equations imply that the demand faced by producer iJ is given
by
Y iJ =
(
P iJ
P J
)−γ(
P J
P
)−θ(
M
P
)
(9)
We solve first for the static optimal price of the individual producer with
index iJ . Such a producer takes the industry price P J , the aggregate price
P , and the money supply M as given and chooses price P iJ to maximize
utility. We shall use the corresponding lower case letters to denote the natural
logarithms of variables (e.g. p is lnP ). The optimal price is given by
p∗iJ = αp
J + α′p+ (1− α− α′)m+ αˆλJ (10)
where
α =
(γ − θ)(β − 1)
1 + γ(β − 1) (11)
α′ =
1 + (θ − 1)(β − 1)
1 + γ(β − 1) (12)
αˆ =
1
1 + γ(β − 1) (13)
Note that if γ > θ, α > 0, so that the firm’s optimal price is an increasing
function of the industry price. That is, strategic complementarity at the
industry level follows immediately from the assumption that the elasticity
of substitution is greater for products within the industry than across the
industry. On the other hand, α′ can be either positive or negative, since we
do not need to assume that the industry elasticity of demand θ exceeds one
(an assumption which is necessary in the standard model). In what follows,
we shall often simplify by assuming that α′ = 0.
2.1 Equilibrium
Let us now assume that all industries have the same productivity parameter
λJ , which is normalized to zero. That is, we assume that there are no industry
specific shocks at this point. To see that a symmetric equilibrium exists, note
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that if each producer consumer sets her price equal to m, then equation (10)
will be satisfied. This is indeed the only equilibrium in this (static) model.
Since each firm is of measure zero, every firm in industry J faces the same
industry price (even if individual firms choose different prices) and the same
aggregate price. By equation (10), every firm in industry J must therefore
choose the same price. We can therefore re-write (10) for the equilibrium
industry price level as
p∗J =
α′
1− αp+
(1− α− α′)
1− α m (14)
Since each industry faces the same aggregate price level and m, it follows
that the equilibrium industry price is identical for every industry. Thus we
have verified that equilibrium in this (static) model exists, is unique and is
symmetric.
Let us now consider how the utility of the producer-consumer varies with
the prices and money in this economy. The indirect utility function of the
producer consumer can be written as
V = V (m− p, piJ − p∗iJ , pJ − p) (15)
The partial derivatives of the utility function, evaluated at the equilib-
rium, are given by
∂V
∂(m− p) =
1
γ
> 0 (16)
∂V
∂(pJ − p) =
γ − θ
γ
> 0 (17)
Note that a higher industry price (pJ) has a positive effect on producer
utility, since the partial derivative in 17 is positive. Since the derivative
with respect to the firms own price is zero at the optimum, all firms in the
industry would be better off if they could coordinate upon a higher price.
This however is not sustainable as an equilibrium.
This simple static model provides a framework within validates the Calmfors-
Driffill (1988) argument on the relation between the extent of centralization
of wage bargaining and aggregate output/employment. Due to monopolis-
tic competition, equilibrium in this model is clearly inefficient, with prices
being too high and output being too low. This inefficiency is exacerbated if
firms within the industry collude in setting prices. However, if additionally,
if there is centralization and the enforcement of a cooperative arrangement
across the entire economy, prices would be lower and welfare increased —
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this can be seen by noting that in this case the effect of a marginal reduction
in prices is positive and given by 16.
Let us now allow for different industries to have different values of λJ .
Assume that λ is independently and identically distributed across firms, and
has mean zero and is distributed with a density g. We approximate the
aggregate price level by
p =
∫ 1
0
pJdj (18)
We claim that it is an equilibrium for each firm in industry J to set the
same price which is equal to
pJ = m+
αˆ
1− αλJ (19)
To verify this, note that aggregate price is given by
p = m+
αˆ
1− α
∫
λg(λ)dλ = m (20)
where the last step follows from the fact that λ has zero mean. It is now
immediate that in this equilibrium, each firm satisfies the price setting rule
10.
To summarize: equilibrium output does not depend upon the distribution
of productivity shocks, in the absence of menu costs.
3 Menu Costs and Asymmetric Adjustment
Let us now consider the adjustment of prices in this economy to a one-time
shock in the presence of menu costs, i.e. a fixed cost c of adjusting price,
given that the initial situation is one where all producers are choosing price
optimally. Let us normalize the initial values of the money supply and of
the input shock λ to zero, so that all firms in all industries are choosing an
initial price of zero. Our arguments are similar in the case of real shock or a
nominal shock, and it is economical to discuss them together. Let us simplify
the exposition by assuming that α′ = 0, so that the firm’s optimal price does
not depend upon the aggregate price level. Thus the firm’s optimal price,
absent any menu cost, can be re-written as
p∗iJ = αp
J + (1− α)m+ αˆλJ (21)
Defining εJ = (1− α)m+ αˆλJ , the firm’s optimal price is given by
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p∗iJ =
{
εJ if DJ = 0
εJ
1−α
if DJ = 1
(22)
where DJ ∈ {0, 1} is the proportion of firms in the industry which adjust
price. Thus the extent to which a firm’s optimal price changes with a shock
is greater if DJ = 1, i.e. if its industry adjusts price, as compared to the
situation where the industry does not adjust.
Let us now consider the loss to the individual firm from not adjusting.
Since initial prices are chosen optimally, the envelope theorem implies that
the loss to each producer from inertia is second order in ε, so that inertia
is uniquely optimal if |ε| is sufficiently small relative to c (see Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985)). On the other hand, if |ε| is very large, it
is uniquely optimal for each firm in industry J to fully adjust. Our interest
is in the case where |ε| is of intermediate size, since in this case the firm’s
optimal decision depends upon the adjustment decisions of the others. The
loss of the individual producer from not adjusting, depends upon |ε| , and
upon the fraction of firms in the industry who adjust. For our purposes, it
suffices to consider the two extreme cases. If all other firms in the industry
do not adjust price, we denote the loss function by LN(.). If all firms in the
industry adjust price, we denote the loss function by LA(.). Using a second-
order Taylor approximation, the loss functions are given by:
LN(ε) =
1
2
ε2 (23)
LA(ε) =
1
2
(
1
1− α
)2
ε2 (24)
Inspection of the above expressions shows that for any values of ε, LA(ε) >
LN(ε). This follows since α is positive, due to the greater elasticity of sub-
stitution within the industry (γ) as compared to the substitution elasticity
between industries θ.Thus for any given shock, whether due to productivity
or nominal demand, the loss is greater if other firms in the industry adjust as
compared to the situation where the industry does not adjust. This implies
that there are multiple equilibria in adjustment – for values of |ε| of interme-
diate size, there exists an equilibrium where all firms in the industry adjust,
as well as an equilibrium where no firms in the industry adjust. Figure 1
graphs the loss as a function of ε. As one can see from this figure, if |ε| lies
between ε and ε¯, then the firm’s loss is greater than the menu cost if other
firm’s are adjusting, but smaller than the menu cost if other firms in the in-
dustry are not adjusting. Thus one has multiple equilibria in the adjustment
decision at the industry level.
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In the presence of multiple equilibria, we may ask, which equilibrium do
the firms prefer? We may expect that firms in the industry will be able
to coordinate upon the better equilibria, since this coordination of expec-
tations is only required at industry level. It turns out that the answer will
depend upon whether the input shock is positive or negative. For a positive
shock, the firms prefer the equilibrium where they adjust, while for a nega-
tive shock, they prefer the equilibrium where they do not adjust. The reason
for this is straightforward. As we have seen from equation (17), producers
in the industry prefer higher prices, as compared to the equilibrium price.
When ε is positive, adjustment gives rise to the higher industry price, while
when ε is negative, non-adjustment gives the higher industry price. More
precisely, we shall assume that firms in the industry coordinate upon best
(payoff maximizing) equilibrium in adjustment decisions. Such coordination
of adjustment decisions gives rise to asymmetric adjustment thresholds. The
adjustment threshold for positive shocks is ε¯, while the adjustment threshold
for negative shocks is ε.
ε = −
√
2c (25)
ε¯ = (1− α)
√
2c (26)
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Clearly − ε> ε¯, and the magnitude of asymmetry is measured by the
difference in the absolute value of the two thresholds, − ε−ε¯. Asymmetry is
greater the larger is α, which in turn depends on how large γ is relative to
θ, i,.e. the larger elasticity of substitution within industry as compared to
across industries. 2 The asymmetry is pronounced, even for moderate values
of γ. As we shall see from our simulations, if γ = 5 (or greater), and shocks
are normally distributed with standard deviation 0.1, then there is virtually
no adjustment to negative shocks, while 80% of positive shocks meet with
adjustment.3 Thus under plausible parameter values, we are able to explain
the empirical evidence on asymmetric adjustment, such as the findings of
Peltzman (2000), and the other studies cited in the introduction.
Let us now discuss Peltzman’s findings in more detail. Peltzman docu-
ments the incidence of asymmetric adjustment to input shocks in a diverse
range of industries. Peltzman explores the suggestion that collusion may
be responsible for asymmetries, and finds the incidence of asymmetry is not
greater in more concentrated industries.4 Our theory does not rely upon
the number of firms being few or the market being concentrated in order
to explain asymmetric adjustment. Indeed, our formal model shows that
such asymmetries are possible in industries with a continuum of firms, each
of whom serves a negligible fraction of the market. What is the relation
between asymmetric adjustment and collusion? Our explanation for asym-
metric adjustment is based on inability of firms to collude fully. If firms in an
industry were able to collude, they would choose the monopoly price (with
a markup on marginal cost equal to θ
θ−1
, based on the industry elasticity of
demand, rather than the markup of γ
γ−1
which is based on the firm level elas-
ticity of demand). If such collusion is sustainable, firms have no incentive to
seek higher prices, and hence the rationale for asymmetric adjustment disap-
pears. As against this, one might argue that industries with fewer firms may
be not be able to collude, but maybe better placed to coordinate upon asym-
metric adjustment rules. This might be a countervailing reason for expecting
asymmetries to be more likely in industries with fewer firms.
What are the macroeconomic implications of asymmetric adjustment?
In our model, aggregate output is given by the simple quantity relation,
y = m − p. Thus output effects are inversely related to the extent of price
2If γ = θ, the two loss functions LA and LN collapse to a single one, and the asymmetry
vanishes. In this case, the behavior of firm’s own industry becomes irrelevant because the
individual industry is of measure zero in the aggregate economy.
3Table 2 reports these simulations, which are for nominal shocks, but a similar feature
applies to real shocks.
4On the other hand, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) find that asymmetric adjustment of
bank deposit interest rates is more likely in more concentrated markets.
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adjustment. Let us first consider the effects of sectoral shocks. We assume
that there is no monetary shock (m = 0), and consider productivity shocks
across industries which have zero mean. Thus we let λJ be independently
and identically distributed across industries, with mean zero, so that there is
no aggregate productivity shock. We shall also assume that g,the probability
density function of the random variable λ, satisfies the following assumption.
Distributional Assumption:g(x) = g(−x) so that g is symmetric
around zero. g(x) is strictly decreasing for x > 0.
The new price level is given by
p =
αˆ
1− α
(∫ ∞
λ¯(0)
λg(λ)dλ+
∫ λ(0)
−∞
λg(λ)dλ
)
=
αˆ
1− α
∫ −λ(0)
λ¯(0)
λg(λ)dλ > 0 (27)
where λ¯(0) = (1− α)√2c/αˆ and λ(0) = −√2c/αˆ. In the first expression,
the first term in brackets above is positive while the second term is negative.
Since the thresholds are asymmetric, while g(.) is symmetric, the net effect
of sectoral shocks is to raise the aggregate price level. Thus output falls due
to sectoral shocks. This is in contrast to the case without menu costs, where
sectoral shocks have no effect on output.
Let us now consider the effects of nominal demand shocks, in the pres-
ence of sectoral shocks. Each industry faces a sector specific shock, λJ . In
addition, all industries face a common nominal shock whereby the money
supply changes from zero to m. The aggregate price level is now given by
p = m[1− Pr(N)]− αˆ
1− αµ(λ¯, λ) (28)
where Pr(N) is the probability of non-adjustment, i.e.
Pr(N) = G(λ¯(m))−G(λ(m))
µ(λ¯, λ) =
∫ λ¯(m)
λ(m)
λg(λ)dλ
The thresholds are given by
λ¯(m) =
−√2c− (1− α)m
αˆ
(29)
λ(m) =
(1− α)(√2c−m)
αˆ
(30)
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We may now see why positive shocks to money have smaller (absolute)
output effects than negative shocks. Negative shocks make the adjustment
thresholds (λ¯(m) and λ(m)) more symmetric, while positive shocks to m
make the adjustment thresholds more asymmetric. Since the size of the in-
terval of non-adjustment, λ¯(m) − λ(m), is invariant to changes in m, the
probability of inertia Pr(N) rises with negative shocks and falls with posi-
tive shocks. Furthermore, µ is negative due to asymmetric adjustment, and
becomes larger in absolute value when adjustment becomes more asymmet-
ric. Thus for both these reasons, positive money shocks have larger price
effects than negative ones. This asymmetry has the immediate implication
that fluctuations on nominal aggregate demand have asymmetric real effects.
The absolute size of the output effects of a boom will be smaller than the
output effect of a recession of the same magnitude. This can be seen in table
1 below which reports values of the level of output and the degree of nominal
inertia for various values of the nominal shock. These simulations are based
on the following parameter values, which are empirically plausible. Marginal
costs are assumed to be quadratic, so that β = 2. The value of θ is set so
that the effect of the aggregate price on the individual firm’s price is zero,
i..e. α′ = 0. The elasticity of demand of the individual firm (γ) is set to
5, which corresponds to a mark-up on marginal cost which is 20% of the
product price. The menu cost is set to 0.001, which corresponds to 0.1% of
equilibrium revenues. We assume that shocks are normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation 0.1.
We begin first by reporting that when ∆m = 0, output is 3.5% below the
static equilibrium level. Thus asymmetric output adjustment to real shocks
reduces equilibrium output, as suggested by DeLong and Summers (1988).
However, we do not emphasize this result, since we shall see in the following
sections that it needs to be modified in the dynamic context, where firms
take into account their own asymmetric future behavior when choosing their
initial price. Accordingly, the output levels in table one are reported relative
to the output level for ∆m = 0. Thus we see that negative shocks have larger
absolute effects on output as compared to positive shocks. Nominal inertia
declines with positive shocks, and increases for negative shocks. Indeed, the
level of nominal inertia is a decreasing function of ∆m, except when ∆m is
negative and large in magnitude.
∆m(%) −20 −10 -5 -2 0 2 5 10 20
∆y(%) -8.5 -5.7 -2.8 -1.0 0 0.9 1.9 3.0 3.5
Pr(N) 0.75 0.88 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.48 0.29 0.06
Table 1
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4 Asymmetries in A Dynamic Context
We now consider the implications of asymmetric adjustment in a two period
model. We adopt a set up which involves a mix of time dependent and state
dependent pricing, as in Ball and Mankiw (1994). One-half of all industries
are “odd”, while the remaining are “even”. If a firm belongs to an odd
industry, it adjusts its price for sure in every odd period. In addition, it can
also adjust price in an even period, and this adjustment incurs a menu cost.
Thus it will choose to adjust in the even period if the shock is sufficiently large
relative to the menu cost. Thus in any period, one half of the industries will
be adjusting for sure, while the other half may or may not adjust, depending
upon the shock. This set up has the virtue of combining essential elements
of state dependent pricing (the adjustment decision for odd firms in even
periods is state dependent) with analytical tractability. Our focus is on the
long run effects of asymmetric adjustment on equilibrium output.
Let us consider a firm in a typical “odd” industry. We may consider
nominal as well as productivity shocks, but for simplicity we focus on the
former, and assume that λ = 0 for all industries. Normalize the initial value
of the money supply (in period one), in logs, to zero. In period two, the
money supply equals m. m is a random variable with density function f and
distribution function F, and satisfies the distributional assumption.
Consider the final period, period two. Let us assume that all firms in the
industry have chosen the period zero price equal to x. Note that x need not
be equal to zero, even though the money supply equals zero in period zero.
Indeed, as we shall see, the equilibrium value of x will be negative.
Following the discussion in previous subsection, we assume that the in-
dustry follows an asymmetric adjustment rule. That is, the firms in the
industry will adjust their price if m ≤m or if m ≥ m¯, but will not adjust
their price for values of m lying in the interval (m, m¯). These thresholds are
given by
m = x−
√
2c
1− α (31)
m¯ = x+
√
2c (32)
Let us now solve the equilibrium value of x, which will also determine the
adjustment thresholds in the second period. Let xi denote the price set by
firm i in period one, and let x denote the aggregate industry price in period
one. The firm sets xi in order to minimize the discounted sum of its loss
(and adjustment cost) over the two periods, where δ is the discount factor.
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As before, we assume α′ = 0. The total loss over two periods, as a function
of the first period price is given by
L(xi, x) =
1
2
(xi−αx)2+δ
∫ m¯
m
1
2
[xi−αx−(1−α)m]2f(m)dm+δ[1−Pr(N))]c
(33)
where Pr(N) = F (m¯) − F (m) is the probability that there is no price
adjustment in period two. This expression assumes that the firm sets the
same adjustment thresholds m, m¯ as the industry even if it chooses xi differ-
ent from x. Under this assumption, the thresholds do not vary with xi, and
the first order condition for minimizing the overall loss is given by
L′(xi, x) = (xi − αx) + δ
∫ m¯
m
[xi − αx− (1− α)m]f(m)dm = 0 (34)
In the appendix we show that this expression remains valid even if we
allow for variation in thresholds. That is, a version of the envelope theo-
rem applies also in our context, where the thresholds are determined as an
equilibrium phenomenon, rather than by individual optimization alone.
In a symmetric equilibrium xi = x, which implies
x ==
δµ(m, m¯)
1 + δ Pr(N)
(35)
where µ(m, m¯) =
∫ m¯
m mf(m)dm. Since f is symmetric, µ(m, m¯) vanishes
unless the thresholds are asymmetric. However, due to the asymmetry in
adjustment, µ < 0. It follows that x < 0, i.e. the initial price is lower than
the money supply.
The fact that x < 0 accentuates the asymmetry in adjustment, as can be
seen by examining the expression for the thresholds, m and m¯.
We conclude therefore that with asymmetric thresholds, the firm chooses
a price which is on average higher than the money supply in period two, but
a price lower than the money supply in period one.
We now turn to the output effects of asymmetric adjustment. Since half
the industries adjust in any period, the equilibrium level of output in this
economy is given by average value of money relative to prices (m − p) over
both periods. Denoting average output by y, we gave
y =
1
2
(
−x+
∫ m¯
m
(m− x)f(m)dm
)
(36)
On simplifying this reduces to
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y =
µ(m, m¯)(1− δ)
2(1 + δ Pr(N)
< 0 (37)
That is, although prices are below mt in the initial period, and above mt
in the final period due to asymmetric adjustment, on average they will be too
high, and thus output will be below its static level of zero. The reason for this
is straightforward. Firms choose prices which are below their static optimal
price in the initial period, since they expect adjustment to be asymmetric in
the future. I.e. they know that if they do not adjust, then on average prices
will be too high relative to m in the final period. This provides them with an
incentive to reduce prices below the static optimum, but due to discounting,
they do not reduce them enough. Nevertheless, the effects of equilibrium
output are likely to be much smaller than the static one period model of the
previous section indicated. We shall see that this is indeed the case in the
following section.
How are overall industry profits affected by asymmetric adjustment? Re-
call that asymmetric adjustment is adopted as a response, which keeps in-
dustry profits as high as possible, in the period of adjustment. Thus it must
raise industry profits in period two, the period in which adjustment is an
option. However, we have seen that it reduces prices in period one, and must
therefore reduce industry profits in period one. The overall first order effect
on discounted profits, evaluated at period one is given by
γ − θ
γ
(x(1 + δ Pr(N)− δµ(m, m¯)) = 0 (38)
Thus asymmetric adjustment cannot raise profits from period one’s point
of view, although it does raise it from the point of view of period two. The
positive effects on period two profits are precisely offset by the negative effects
on period one profits. Thus the firms could as well play an equilibrium
with symmetric adjustment, with no first order difference in their profits.
Nevertheless, when it comes to period two, it is collectively optimal for firms
in the industry to pursue asymmetric adjustment, since bygones are bygones.
Thus the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium in this two period game is
one with maximal asymmetric adjustment. Indeed, for any finite horizon, the
unique renegotiation proof equilibrium is the one with maximal asymmetric
adjustment.
The Cyclical Behavior of Price-Cost Margins
Our dynamic pricing model provides a reason why recessions raise price-
cost margins. Consider a negative money shock in an even period. Since
only some odd industries will be adjusting price, this money shock will have
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negative output effects, and thus demand will contract for all firms. Further-
more, for the firms which do not adjust price, marginal costs decline with
the output contraction, and thus the price cost margin rises in the recession..
Since demand contracts overall, the firms which are adjusting price will also
face lower profits and reduced cash flow. If credit markets are imperfect and
internal finance an important consideration, this will raise the effective real
interest rate, i..e reduce δ. Thus firms which are adjusting price will choose
higher prices, i.e. prices closer to those which maximize single period profits.
Thus real prices will rise and the output contraction will be greater. Con-
versely, with a positive money shock, output will expand and the price cost
margin will decline, both due to nominal rigidity, and due to the relaxation
of credit constraints.
This argument for why credit constraints result in a counter-cyclical move-
ment in margins is similar to the explanation which involves customer mar-
kets (e.g.. Greenwald et. al. (1984), Gottfries (1989), Klemperer (1995),
and Chevalier and Sharfstein (1996). In customer markets, prices involve
an investment decision. Similarly, in a menu cost model, since prices today
may persist tomorrow, there is an investment element to the pricing decision.
Thus the evidence in favor of customer market models (e.g.. Chevalier and
Sharfstein, 1996) also applies to our menu cost model.5
5 Inflation
We now consider the implications of trend inflation. Let the money supply in
period one, m˜ be now given by m+pi, where m denotes the money shock and
pi is the trend rate of inflation. As before, we assume that m is distributed
symmetrically with density f. The adjustment thresholds are now given by
m = x− pi −
√
2c
1− α (39)
m¯ = x− pi +
√
2c (40)
where these thresholds apply to m, i.e. the firm adjusts price if m /∈
(m, m¯).
Let us now consider the implications of inflation, i.e. a positive value of
pi. Let us assume for the moment that any change in inflation pi will affect
x less than one for one, i.e. ∂x
∂pi
< 1. Thus under this assumption, positive
5In the absence of credit constraints, the customer market model can result in either
pro or counter cyclical markups (Klemperer, 1995).
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inflation will increase the asymmetry in adjustment since m¯ and m both fall.
Note also that the size of the interval of non-adjustment (m, m¯) is invariant
with respect to changes in pi. The effect on the probability of non-adjustment
is given by
dPr(N)
dpi
=
(
∂x
∂pi
− 1
)
[f(m¯)− f(m)] < 0 (41)
Under the distributional assumption, f(m¯) > f(m), which implies that
inertia declines with inflation, as a consequence of adjustment becoming more
asymmetric.
Similarly, we can define µ as before. The effect on µ is given by
dµ
dpi
=
(
∂x
∂pi
− 1
)
(m¯f(m¯)−mf(m)) < 0 (42)
Let us now consider the effect of inflation upon initial prices. Let δ denote
the real discount rate, i.e. δ = 1/(1 + r) where r is the real interest rate.
Thus the optimal value of x satisfies
x =
δ[µ(m, m¯) + pi Pr(N)]
1 + δ Pr(N)
(43)
Differentiating this expression, we find
dx
dpi
=
δΩ
1 + δΩ
(44)
where Ω is given by
Ω(pi) = [Pr(N)− f(m¯)m¯+ f(m)m]− [f(m¯)− f(m)](pi − x) (45)
Note that the first term in Ω is strictly positive, due to the distributional
assumption. Although we cannot show that Ω is always positive for all values
of inflation, simulations suggest that this is the case in a large range.
Let us now consider the effect of inflation on period two prices. The
average level of period two prices relative to money is given by
z =
∫ m¯
m
(x− pi −m)f(m)dm = Pr(N)(x− pi)− µ (46)
Hence
dz
dpi
= −
(
1− dx
dpi
)
Ω (47)
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Aggregating across odd and even industries, the average level output in
the economy is given by
y =
1
2
(
−x+
∫ m¯
m
(pi +m− x)f(m)dm
)
(48)
The derivative of this with respect to inflation is given by
dy
dpi
=
Ω(1− δ)
2(1 + δΩ)
(49)
which is positive as long as Ω > 0.We now do some simulations in order
to investigate the effects of changes in inflation. We choose parameter values
as in our previous simulation. The discount factor δ is set at 0.9. We assume
that m is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 0.1.
Since industry specific supply shocks and money supply shocks play a similar
role in our model, we should really think of these shocks as the sum of the two
types of shock — as Peltzman documents, there is considerable variability
in industry supply shocks. Table 2 reports our results for different values of
the inflation rate. Let us focus first on case of zero inflation, which is at the
middle of the table. Note that there is significant asymmetry in adjustment
— a 2% positive shock results in adjustment, whereas the threshold for a
negative shock is more than ten times larger at -29%. In consequence, the
initial price x is 2.3% below the static equilibrium value. Equilibrium output
in the economy is negative, and about 0.1% lower than the static equilibrium
value. In other words, asymmetric adjustment causes an output loss of about
0.1%.
pi(%) −20 −10 -4 -2 0 2 4 10 20
m -0.16 -0.22 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 -0.37 -0.47
m¯ 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.16
Pr(N) 0.88 0.80 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.53 0.47 0.28 0.06
µ 0.000 -0.023 -0.034 -0.036 -0.038 -0.039 -0.040 0.033 -0.012
x -0.089 -0.054 -0.034 -0.028 -0.023 -0.018 -0.013 -0.004 0.000
y(%) -0.5 -0.3 -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.00
Table 2
Let us now consider the effects of inflation. As inflation rises, the asym-
metry in adjustment is accentuated, and the probability of inertia declines,
reflecting this. Output rises gradually, till at 20% inflation it is equal to (ap-
proximately) the static equilibrium level. With deflation, the asymmetry in
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adjustment is reduced, and indeed vanishes at -20%. This increasing symme-
try is accompanied by greater nominal inertia. Output falls with deflation,
to -0.5% below the static equilibrium level when pi = −20%. Thus we find
that inflation has a monotone effect on nominal inertia and on equilibrium
output.
We therefore find that inflation raises output, and mitigates the effects
of asymmetric price adjustment. Nevertheless, the effect does not seem too
large. At zero inflation, output is 0.13% below the static equilibrium level.
This is similar in magnitude to the menu cost of 0.001. The utility loss due
to reduced output can be computed and is approximately 0.0003, i.e. about
one-third of the menu cost. By raising inflation to 20% one can eliminate this
output loss, but at the cost of increasing price adjustment. Thus it seems
unlikely that for these parameter values, raising inflation substantially to
increase output is a useful strategy. On the other hand, by raising inflation
to 4%, one can recoup approximately one-half of the output loss due to
asymmetric adjustment. These numbers also suggest that deflation is costly
in terms of output.6
Our findings have relevance to measures of the welfare costs of inflation
— Lucas (2000) provides a comprehensive discussion. These welfare costs
arise since nominal interest rates provide socially inappropriate incentives
for consumes to economize on money holdings. Lucas assumes that the real
interest rate equals 3%, with the nominal rate being equal to the sum of the
real rate and the inflation rate. The evidence suggests that there are major
welfare gains from reducing nominal rates from 10% to 3%, by reducing
inflation to zero. However, there is some uncertainty about the size of the
welfare gain from reducing nominal rates to zero, via trend deflation — some
specifications suggesting a similar large gain, while other specifications imply
a modest effect. In the light of this discussion, our analysis suggests that a
moderate negative output effect from reducing inflation towards zero needs
to be taken into account. The output loss from trend deflation seems to be
larger, thus further qualifying Lucas’s conclusions.
6 Conclusions
We have set out a simple model of imperfect competition where asymmet-
ric adjustment to nominal shocks emerges naturally, even in the absence of
6In this context, we should note that menu cost models suggest that inflation can
increase welfare by reducing firm’s monopoly power, in a non-stochastic environment (see
Benabou (1992) and Diamond (1993)). Diamond reports that deflation is also effective in
increasing welfare.
19
trend inflation, which is one explanation for asymmetric adjustment (Ball and
Mankiw (1994) and Tsiddon (1993)). Firms in an industry would like to have
higher prices, but competition prevents them from sustaining this. Asym-
metric adjustment to shocks is an equilibrium which permits such higher
prices on average. Such asymmetric rigidities mean that negative demand
shocks have larger effects than positive ones, and also imply that equilibrium
output is on average smaller. We now discuss some of the related literature.
Ball and Romer’s (1991) were the first to show the possibility of multiple
equilibria in the context of the standard model of monopolistic competition,
where each industry consists of a single firm. If there are aggregate strategic
complementarities in price setting, so that the optimal industry price is an
increasing function of the aggregate price level, there can be multiple equilib-
ria in adjustment decisions for intermediate values of shocks. Ball and Romer
do not explore the possibility of asymmetric adjustment in this context – this
is natural, since multiple equilibria only arise at the level of the aggregate
economy, it is unrealistic to expect that agents will be able to coordinate
their decisions at this level.7 Indeed, their focus is on coordination failure,
in contrast to the present paper which argues that coordination can emerge
more easily at industry level. In contrast to standard models of multiple
equilibria, which suggest that “anything is possible”, our argument is based
on systematically selecting a unique equilibrium, and seeing how the proper-
ties of the selected equilibrium varies with changes in the environment such
as trend inflation.
Driscoll and Ito (1998) consider the implications of collusion, in the con-
text of the standard model. If all firms in the economy collude, they would
do so by reducing prices rather than by raising them, in order mitigate the
aggregate demand externality. They also show that if only partial collusion
is sustainable, this may result in asymmetric price adjustment. In our view,
sustaining collusion at an economy wide level requires rather stringent in-
formational assumptions If any firm is negligible, individual prices will have
no effect on the aggregate price, and sustaining collusion requires that each
individual firm’s price is observed by all other firms in the economy. Bennett
and La Manna (2001) provide an argument for the reverse asymmetry, where
prices are more flexible downwards, based on a combination of Bertrand com-
petition with Stackelberg price leadership.
Our focus in this paper has entirely been on price adjustment, since it is
likely that entirely different considerations apply to wage setting behavior.
7Indeed, if coordination was possible at the aggregate level, one should expect the
reverse asymmetry, since at the aggregate level prices are too high rather than being too
low.
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Bewley’s interview study (1999) finds that factors of morale and efficiency
wage arguments are an important reason for the reluctance of employers to
cut wages. Our analysis suggests employers may take into account their
own future inability to cut wages, thus setting wages lower than they would
otherwise do.
A number of papers also analyze the implications of the current low in-
flation environment, and suggest that this may reduce equilibrium output.
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1999) argue that low inflation is not incorpo-
rated in wage setting, thus producing a long run inflation-unemployment
trade-off at low rates of inflation. Holden (2001) argues that the legal basis
of wage contracts in Europe gives rise to downward nominal wage rigidity
and adverse equilibrium employment effects.
7 Appendix
We show that the first order condition for minimizing the loss (equation 34)
remains valid at the symmetric equilibrium when we allow the thresholds
to vary with the choice of xi. Consider xi in the neighborhood of x, where
xi < x. In this case, since m¯ is the smallest (absolute) value of the shock such
that adjustment is an equilibrium, and since m¯ − xi is larger than m¯ − x,
it remains optimal for the firm to not vary its upper threshold. Similarly,
since m is the largest absolute value of the shock such that adjustment is an
equilibrium, xi− m is smaller than x− m, it remains optimal for the firm
to not vary its lower threshold. Thus the left hand derivative of the loss
function evaluated at xi = x is indeed given by equation 34.
Consider next the case where xi > x. In this case, the firm will indeed
find it optimal to vary both its thresholds with xi, and these are given by
mi = xi −
√
2c
1− α (50)
m¯i = xi +
√
2c (51)
Thus the loss function differs from that given in the text by the term
δ
∫ m¯i
m¯
{1
2
[xi−αx−(1−α)m]2−c}f(m)dm−δ
∫ mi
m
{1
2
[xi−αx−(1−α)m]2−c}f(m)dm
(52)
Thus the right hand derivative of the true loss function evaluated at
xi = x is given by the derivative of the above expression 52 added to the
expression in 34. Differentiating 52, we get
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(
(x− m¯)2
2
− c
)
f(m¯)−
(
(1− α)2(x−m)2
2
− c
)
1
1− αf(m) = 0 (53)
Thus the right hand derivative of the true loss function at a symmetric
equilibrium is also given by 34.
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